This is why the will is able to take decisive decisions against the dictating ruling of the mind, even if the latter shows that the desired object is actually bad. Moreover, in its decisive ruling, the will does not follow the act of an external power, rather it draws this very act to its own act. Therefore when it is said that the will follows the dictate of the mind, than this does not mean that it does so necessarily. Furthermore – however much the reason might dictate, the decisive choice lies only in the power of the will. The two different types of ruling constitute two different types of decision taking – the first is a dictating one and it takes place only in the mind, and the second is a decisive one and cannot be actualized without the will. Here, however, Bonaventure introduces a stronger role of the will, which seems to be autonomous with respect to the dictate of reason. However, only through the will the mind is enabled to rule authoritatively. Therefore, Bonaventure holds that the mind on itself is ruling in a consulting or a predisposing manner. Without the deliberation of the mind, the will will not be able at all to produce or abstain from an act.
#AFFECTUS IN DEUM FREE#
įurthermore, the process of taking a free decision begins in the mind, since the variety of possibilities is presented from the intellectual part of the soul, and ends in the will, which is the final authority that realizes the act itself. Without the self-reflection of the mind, it we will not be able to refrain from certain decisions and without the self-movement of the will, we will not be able to produce the act itself.
The second is based on the capability of both will and mind to turn towards himself or herself – the mind is self-reflexive, while the will is self-moving. The first is based on its immaterial nature, which enables it to rule over material objects. There are two reasons why the free decision is said to be really free. The notion of liberum, free, comes from the activity of the will and arbitrium, decision, from the activity of the mind. According to Bonaventure, the very name of the notion of free decision stems from the cooperation of will and intellect. The second question, on the other hand, tries to discuss how the two capacities of the soul – will and intellect – are working together in order to produce the free decision. The first question is interested to see how the will is free to actualize its decisions without an external influence from the intellect or the object of desire. The main difference between discussing the freedom of the will and the free decision could be formulated in the following manner. However, we would like to argue that already in his texts we might find a strong emphasis on the significance of the will, even if it was not precisely defined with respect to terminology Even though Bonaventure is a leading name in the Franciscan tradition, he was not familiar with the later discussions on independence and primicy of the will and therefore bringing up his name might seem as an anachronism. In the previous decades and centuries, however, the discussions on freedom were mostly focused on liberum arbitrium, the free decision, and Bonaventure’s texts are not in any regard exception from this. Therefore, libertas voluntatis, or the freedom of the will became one of the preferred topics concerning freedom. Since more than 15 of the condemned articles were concerning the will and its dependency on the intellect or the desired object, a debate arose whether the will can act autonomously.
#AFFECTUS IN DEUM PDF#
PDF Keywords: freedom of the will, free decision, epistemology, Bonaventure, grace, voluntarism, synderesis.Īfter the famous condemnation of 1277, when the Bishop of Paris condemned of 219 propositions as contrary to the faith, emerged a relatively new debate. In the current paper we would present the epistemology of Bonaventure and its relation to the will, grace and synderesis. Based on this emphasis the project aims to study the relation between the will and the processes of acquiring knowledge. one that puts a strong emphasis on the independence of the will and its significant place in the human soul.
Modern historians of philosophy often characterize Franciscan thought as “voluntaristic”, i.e. Abstract: In the current paper we would like to present briefly some of the results of a broader project which investigates the theories of the will and the epistemological theories in the High Medieval Franciscan thought.
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